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FIRST AMENDMENT AND EQUAL
PROTECTION-SELECTIVE SERVICE
OR PROSECUTION FOR THE
"VOCAL" NONREGISTRANTS?
Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Wayte v. United States,' the Supreme Court 2 held that the
United States government's passive enforcement policy, under
which the Department of Justice prosecuted only those young men
who reported themselves, or who were reported by others, as violators of the law requiring them to register with the Selective Service
System, constituted neither selective prosecution nor violated the
defendant's right to free speech. The Supreme Court concluded
that the defendant had failed to show that the passive enforcement
policy had the discriminatory effect and the discriminatory purpose
required for a successful selective prosecution claim.3 The Court
also concluded that the defendant, who had publicly stated his opposition to registration with the Selective Service, could not demonstrate that the policy created an unjustified limitation upon his first
4
amendment right to free speech.

II.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On July 2, 1980, President Carter issued a Presidential Proclamation 5 requiring male citizens born during 1960 to register with
1 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
2 Justice Powell delivered the Court's opinion. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan, dissented.
3

105 S. Ct. at 1532.

4 Id. at 1534.
5 Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Procla-

mation No. 4771), reprintedin 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 at 233-34 (1982). President Carter
issued the proclamation pursuant to his statutory authority, the Military Selective Ser-
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the Selective Service System. 6 Although required to register, David
Alan Wayte did not do so. Instead, on August 4, 1980, Wayte wrote
letters to the President and the Selective Service declaring that he
7
did not intend to register.
The Selective Service adopted a passive enforcement policy
whereby it would investigate and prosecute only those nonregistrants brought to its attention.8 This pool of reported violators included those men who reported themselves to the government, like
Wayte, and those men who were reported by third parties. 9 On
June 17, 1981, the Selective Service sent letters to suspected violators. 10 This letter explained the duty to register, requested that the
addressee comply by filling out an enclosed registration form, and
warned of criminal prosecution for continued non-compliance. 1
12
Wayte received the letter, but did not respond.
In July 1981, the Selective Service turned over to the Department of Justice the files of 134 men, including Wayte, identified
through the passive enforcement system. 13 The Department ofJustice referred the names of those nonregistrants still required to regvice Act, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 605 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App. § 453(a)
(1982)). Section 453(a) provides in pertinent part:
[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States.... who, on the day
or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such
time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by
proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder.
50 U.S.C. App. § 453(a).
6 Males born in 1961 were to register during the week ofJuly 28, 1980. Those born
in 1962 were to register during the week ofJanuary 5, 1981. Males born afterJanuary 1,
1963 are to register within 30 days before or after their eighteenth birthday. Proclamation No. 4771, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. App. § 453, at 233.
Although one registering under the Military Selective Service Act might say he is
"registering for the draft," no one currently is being drafted in the United States. "The
United States requires only that young men register for military service while most other
major countries of the world require actual service." 105 S. Ct. at 1527 n.1 (emphasis in
original).
7 In his first letter to the Selective Service, Wayte wrote, "I have not registered for
the draft. I plan never to register. I realize the possible consequences of my action, and
I accept them." 105 S. Ct. at 137, n.2. Wayte's second letter to the Selective Service
stated in part: "Well, I did not register, and still plan never to do so, but thus far I have
received no reply to my letter, much less any news about your much-threatened prosecutions." Id.
8 Id. at 1528.
9 Id.
10 Id.
1 Id. Punishment for failure to register is "imprisonment for not more than five

years or a fine of not more than $10,000," or both. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a), amended by
50 U.S.C.A. App. § 462(a) (West Supp. 1985).
12 105 S.Ct. at 1528.
13 Id.
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ister to the F.B.I. for additional investigation. 14 The United States
Attorney for the district in which each nonregistrant in this group
resided was notified of these investigations. 15
The Justice Department did not immediately begin prosecutions.16 Instead, the Department established what became known as
the "beg" policy.' 7 Under this policy, United States Attorneys were
first required to notify the suspected nonregistrants that unless they
registered within a specified time, the Department would begin
prosecution procedures.' 8 The Department's policy was to notify
each nonregistrant that criminal investigation had actually begun
but would be terminated if the nonregistrant would register prior to
indictment.' 9 The United States Attorney for the Central District of
California sent such a letter to Wayte on October 15, 1981.20 Wayte
2
again failed to respond. '
In December 1981, the Justice Department imposed a moratorium on efforts to indict nonregistrants. 22 In January 1982, President Reagan established a grace period, allowing nonregistrants to
register without penalty until February 28, 1982.23 Wayte did not
24
register during the grace period.
The Justice Department recognized that the passive enforcement system would lead to prosecutions of "a large sample of persons who object on religious and moral grounds and persons who
publicly refuse to register." 2 5 The Department also recognized that
each nonregistrant prosecuted under the passive system would
probably allege that his prosecution was "in retribution for the
nonregistrant's exercise of his first amendment rights." 26 Because
14

Id.

15 Id.
16 Id.
17

Id.

18 Id.
19 Memorandum ofJuly 16, 1981 from DavidJ. Kline, Senior Legal Advisor, Protec-

tion of Government Operations, General Litigation and Advice Section, to Lawrence
Lippe, Chief, Department ofJustice, Criminal Division, General Litigation and Advice
Section, reprinted in Joint Appendix to Briefs at 248, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct.
1524 (1985).
20 105 S. Ct. at 1528.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Memorandum of June 30, 1982 from Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, D. Lowell Jensen, to F. Henry Habight II, Special Assistant to Attorney General
William French Smith, reprintedin Brief for Appellee at 5-6, United States v. Wayte, 710
F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
26 Memorandum of March 17, 1982 from Lawrence Lippe, Chief, Department of'Justice, Criminal Division, General Litigation and Legal Advice Section, to D. Lowell Jen-
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Social Security records could not provide current addresses for the
thousands of nonregistrants, the Selective Service informed the justice Department that it could not develop an accurate identification
system for some time.2 7 Until that time, the Justice Department
28
would have to continue under the passive enforcement system.
The Justice Department resumed prosecution procedures
under the passive enforcement system in June 1982.29 On June 28,
Wayte declined requests to register during an interview with F.B.I.
sen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, reprintedin Joint Appendix to Briefs
at 301, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
In aJuly 9, 1982 memorandum to United States Attorneys, Assistant Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen acknowledged that because the initial prosecutions would be of
men publicly refusing to register, the passive enforcement system would raise "thorny
selective enforcement claims." United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1381-82
(C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), aft'd, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
27 105 S. Ct. at 1529, 1534.
28 Id. at 1529. On December 1, 1981, Congress amended 50 U.S.C. App. § 462,
adding subsection(e), which states:
The President may require the Secretary of Health and Human Services to furnish
to the Director [of Selective Service], from records available to the Secretary, the
following information with respect to individuals who are members of any group of
individuals required by a proclamation of the President under § 3 [§ 453] to present
themselves for and submit to registration under such section: name, date of birth,
social security account number, and address. Information furnished to the Director
by the Secretary under this subsection shall be used only for the purpose of the
enforcement of this Act.
50 U.S.C. App. § 462(e) (1982).
The district court, which dismissed the indictment against Wayte, believed that the
Selective Service had the ability to identify nonregistrants shortly after Wayte's indictment on July 22, 1982. The district court, Judge Hatter, quoted from a statement prepared by Thomas K. Turnage, Director of the Selective Service System, for presentation
onJuly 28, 1982 to the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
ofJustice of the HouseJudiciary Committee. "General Turnage stated that '[i]n August,
we start realizing the results of a more active compliance program with the ultimate goal
of identification of all non-registrants. This program involves matching our Selective
Service registrant files with files of the Social Security Administration."' United States v.
Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
The United States' brief on the petition for writ of certiorari refuted the district
court's statement.
Although arrangements were made with the Department of Health and Human
Services for use of Social Security data by June 1982, it turned out that current
addresses of nonregistrants could be obtained only from the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS declined to divulge that information, believing that disclosure would
violate 26 U.S.C. 6103 ....
Once it became clear that "active" enforcement of the registration law could
not depend on the use of social security data, Selective Service began negotiations
with state departments of motor vehicles for the names and addresses of eligible
men in driver license files. The first referrals of non-registrants by Selective Service to the Department of Justice arising from that system occurred in February
1983.
Brief for the United States on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8 n.4, Wayte v. United
States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
29 Brief for the United States at 7, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
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agents. 30 A grand jury indicted Wayte on July 22, 1982 for knowingly and willfully failing to register with the Selective Service, in
3
violation of the Military Selective Service Act. '
III.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

David Wayte moved the district court to dismiss his indictment
on grounds of selective prosecution. 32 Wayte argued that because
all of the nonregistrants indicted to date were "vocal" opponents of
registration,3 3 the Justice Department had selected Wayte and the
others for prosecution based on the exercise of their first amendment rights.3 4 Wayte "sought to subpoena Presidential Counsellor
Edwin Meese III, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Selective Service Director Thomas Tumage, and Assistant Attorney General D. Lowell Jensen."3 5 Wayte also sought to discover internal
documents of the Selective Service, the Justice Department, the
Presidential Military Manpower Task Force, and the White House
36

Staff.

After a hearing, District Judge Hatter granted Wayte's discovery request. 3 7 The government complied in part with the discovery
order, but refused to comply with the remainder, asserting execu30 105 S. Ct. at 1529.
31 Id. Wayte's indictment was for violation of sections 3 and 12(a) which correspond,
as amended, to 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 and 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a), amended by 50
U.S.C.A. App. § 4 6 2(a) (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 5 for pertinent text of
§ 453(a). Section 462(a) provides in part that "[any person) who ...evades or refuses
registration or service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this title...
shall, upon conviction in any district court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished .... For a description of the punishment provided in § 462(a) for
failure to register, see supra note 11.
32 Wayte also urged the district court to dismiss the indictment because the government had refused to comply with the court's discovery order. In addition, Wayte argued
that the Selective Service's registration regulations and Presidential Proclamation No.
4771 "were illegally promulgated and, therefore, invalid." 549 F. Supp. at 1378.
33 The district court used 500,000 as a "conservative figure" for the total number of
nonregistrants. Id. at 1379. The Director of Selective Service, Thomas K. Turnage,
stated during a congressional hearing on July 28, 1982 that there were 674,000 total
nonregistrants. Oversight Hearing on Selective Service Prosecutions before the Subcommittee on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House Committee on theJudiciary,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1982). Only sixteen men, all self-reported nonregistrants opposed to registration, were indicted under the passive enforcement system before that
system was replaced with an active one. See 105 S. Ct. at 1529 n.3.
34 See 549 F. Supp. at 137-80.
35 Brief for the United States at 10, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
36 Id.
37 Judge Hatter conducted this first hearing on September 30, 1982 in order "to
determine whether the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of
selective prosecution." 549 F. Supp. at 1379.
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tive privilege.3 8 After an evidentiary hearing on the selective prosecution claim, 3 9 the court ordered the government to produce certain
documents and Mr. Meese. The government declined to do so and
requested that the district judge dismiss the indictment in order to
40
allow an appeal.
On November 15, 1982, the district court dismissed the indictment.4 1 The court held that Wayte had established a prima facie
case of selective prosecution which the government had failed to rebut.4 2 The court concluded that a defendant's selective prosecution
claim must pass a two-pronged test in order to establish a prima
facie case. 43 A defendant must prove that "others similarly situated
generally have not been prosecuted for conduct similar to that for
which the defendant was prosecuted" and that "the Government's
discriminatory selection of defendant for prosecution was based on
impermissible grounds such as race, religion or exercise of the de44
fendant's first amendment right of free speech."
The court held that Wayte had met the first requirement by
showing that of the thousands c9f nonregistrants, all those prosecuted were vocal opponents of registration. 45 The court reasoned
Id. at 1383.
The pretrial evidentiary hearing on the selective prosecution claim took place on
October 7, 1982. At the hearing, David J. Kline, Senior Legal Advisor in the General
Litigation and Legal Advice Section, Criminal Division, Department ofJustice, and Richard Romero, the Assistant U.S Attorney prosecuting Wayte, testified for the government. The government submitted the affidavits of Jensen, Turnage and Edward
Frankle, former Associate Director of Selective Service. Id. at 1382.
40 Id. at 1379. "The government respectfully declined to comply [with the district
court's production order] and suggested that the court dismiss the indictment in order
to allow an appeal to be pursued with respect to the validity of the sweeping discovery
ordered by the court." Brief for the United States at 13, Wayte v. United States, 105 S.
Ct. 1524 (1985).
41 549 F. Supp. at 1391. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
with prejudice based on its finding of selective prosecution. Id.
42 In the October 29th order directing the government to produce Mr. Meese to
testify, the court also found that the defendant had established a prima facie case of
selective prosecution. 549 F. Supp. at 1378 n.1.
Because the government refused to comply with the order, it could not rebut that
finding. According to the court, the refusal "raise[d] serious questions as to whether
the Government ha[d] pursued this case in good faith." Id. at 1383.
43 549 F. Supp. at 1380 (citing United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1975) and United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974)).
See also Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 732 (1979).
44 549 F. Supp. at 1380 (citing Scott, 521 F.2d at 1188, and Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1207).
45 549 F. Supp. at 1381. The court stated: The court finds it hard to believe that the
prosecutive arm of the Government, with access to Social Security records, could not
locate any nonregistrants other than those who were vocal in their opposition to draft
registration." Id. The district court and Supreme Court may have ultimately reached
opposite results in the case because the former believed the government could have
implemented an active enforcement system much earlier, while the latter believed that
38
39
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that Wayte had satisfied the second requirement for three reasons.
The court first noted that "an enforcement procedure that focuses
upon the vocal offender is inherently suspect .... "46 Second, the
court pointed out that the government knew that the passive enforcement system would raise "thorny selective prosecution
claims." 4 7 Finally, "[t]he involvement of Mr. Meese and the Presidential Military Manpower Task Force in prosecutorial decisions
creates... a strong inference of impropriety with regard to the Government's motive in seeking the prosecution of this defendant
....
48 Once the defendant had established a prima facie case, the
49
court held that the burden of proof shifted to the government.
The court dismissed the case because the government failed to bear
that burden. 50
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 5 1 The
court of appeals applied the same two-pronged test used by the district court, but concluded that Wayte had not satisfied the second
requirement. 52 Wayte met the first requirement by showing that all
nonregistrants indicted to date, out of thousands of nonregistrants,
were vocal opponents of registration. 53 The court of appeals, however, held that Wayte had failed to establish a case of selective prosecution because "Wayte ha[d] not shown that he was selected from
the larger group [of all nonregistrants] because of his exercise of his
constitutional rights." 54 The court admitted that Wayte's evidence
and internal government documents did show that the government
was aware that the passive enforcement system would result in prosecutions of vocal nonregistrants, who would then probably make selective prosecution claims. 55 Nevertheless, the court of appeals
the Selective Service had made honest efforts to bring on line the active system as early
as possible. See 105 S. Ct. at 1534; supra note 28.
46 549 F. Supp. at 1381 (quoting United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th
Cir. 1972)).
47 549 F. Supp. at 1382 (quoting Memorandum ofJuly 9, 1982 from D. LowellJensen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to United States Attorneys).
48 549 F. Supp. at 1382.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1391. The court also dismissed the indictment on the separate grounds that
Presidential Proclamation No. 4771 was invalidly promulgated. Id.
51 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983).
52 Id. at 1387.
53 Id.
54 Id. (emphasis added). Judge Schroeder dissented. She believed that the passive
enforcement policy "was designed to punish only those who had communicated their
violation of the law to others." 710 F.2d at 1389 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). In her view
there was no "doubt that Wayte [had] established that [his] prosecution was impermissibly based upon his exercise of first amendment rights." Id.
55 710 F.2d at 1387.
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concluded that "the district court's finding of selective prosecution
56
was clearly erroneous."
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

After the court of appeals reversed the district court's finding of
selective prosecution, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
selective prosecution issue. 57 The Supreme Court affirmed the deci56 Id. at 1388. The court of appeals approved of two justifications for the passive
enforcement policy that the government offered. First, the government pointed out that
the identities of other nonregistrants were not known. Id. The district court had said
that "[tihe inference is strong that the Government could have located non-vocal nonregistrants, but chose not to." 549 F. Supp. at 1381. The court of appeals declined to
draw the district court's inference and accepted the government's first explanation. 710
F.2d at 1388.
The government's second explanation was that vocal nonregistrants had expressed
their willful violation of the law. The court of appeals accepted this as a permissible
motive "in making prosecutorial decisions." Id. Judge Schroeder, in her dissent, rejected this explanation. She pointed out that a nonregistrant's refusal to register when
offered the opportunity during the government's "beg" procedures established the
nonregistrant's willful violation of the law. Id. at 1390 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
The court of appeals accepted the government's explanations for the passive enforcement policy and thus held that the government had not based the policy on impermissible grounds. The Supreme Court would later also accept these two explanations
while upholding the policy against Wayte's first amendment challenge. See text accompanying infra notes 79-83.
57 Wayte v. United States, 104 S.Ct. 2655 (1985)(granting certiorari limited to the
first question in the petition). The petitioner's first question was: "May the United
States validly investigate and prosecute for refusal to register with the Selective Service
only those individuals who are selected pursuant to an enforcement program designed
to identify vocal opponents to draft registration?" Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at i, Wayte v. United States, 105 S.Ct. 1524
(1985).
The majority was thus correct when it refused to decide whether Wayte was entitled
to discover government documents regarding his selective prosecution claim, an issue
discussed by the dissent, because that issue "was neither raised in the petition for certiorari, briefed on the merits, nor raised at oral argument." 105 S.Ct. at 1530 n.5.
The Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the selective prosecution
issue and because of a conflict between the circuits on that issue. In United States v.
Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1984)(en banc), the court of appeals held that the
nonregistrant had failed to show that the government had based its prosecution of him
on an impermissible ground-his right of free speech. 733 F.2d at 1295. Although the
court assumed that Eklund had shown he was singled out for prosecution from the
thousands of non-vocal nonregistrants, because the second requirement for a selective
prosecution claim was not met, the court upheld Eklund's conviction. In United States
v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983), the court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction for failure to register. Id. at 1048. The court concluded that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of selective prosecution.
After the Court's decision in Wayte, the Court resolved the conflict by granting certiorari in Schmucker. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit and remanded for consideration in light of Wayte. United States v.
Schmucker, 105 S.Ct. 1860 (1985).
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sion of the court of appeals. 5s
The Court first noted that a prosecutor in our criminal justice
system "retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." 59 The
Court stated that there are "substantial concerns that make the
courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute. ' '6 The court wrote, however, that constitutional constraints
prevent a prosecutor from basing his decision on race, religion, or
6
the exercise of constitutional rights. '
62
The Court, applying "ordinary equal protection standards,"
"

first addressed Wayte's selective prosecution claim. In order to establish selective prosecution, the Court stated that Wayte must
"show both that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. "63
Thus, the Court applied the same two-pronged test applied by the
district court and the court of appeals. The Court concluded that
Wayte had failed to show that the passive prosecution system had
had a discriminatory effect upon vocal nonregistrants. 64 The Court

examined "the pool of potential prosecutees" 6 5 and the pool of defendants and concluded that those nonregistrants "similarly situated" to Wayte were only those who were known to the government,
not nonregistrants whom the government could not identify at the
58 Wayte, 105 S. Ct. at 1535.
59
60

Id. at 1531.
Id.

61 Id. (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (quoting Oyler v.
Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))). The Oyler decision was the first and only previous
Supreme Court decision concerning the selective prosecution defense. In Oyler, the defendant was prosecuted after his third felony conviction under West Virginia's habitual
criminal statute. The defendent alleged that he had been selectively prosecuted, and
thus denied the equal protection of law guaranteed by the Constitution. Oyler, 368 U.S.
at 454. The defendant demonstrated that of the six men in his county potentially subject to prosecution as habitual offenders, only he was sentenced under the statute. Id at
454-55. The Court rejected the selective prosecution claim, stating that "[e]ven though
the statistics in this case might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated
that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification." Id. at 456.
The various circuits used this language while developing the two-pronged test later
applied to Wayte's claim by the district court, the court of appeals, and used here by the
Supreme Court.
62 105 S. Ct. at 1531 (citing Oyler). The Court noted that "[a]lthough the Fifth
Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, does not contain an equal protection clause, it does
contain an equal protection component." Id. at 1531 n.9. The Court cited Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the District of Columbia companion case to Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
63 105 S. Ct. at 1531.
64 Id. at 1532.
65 Justice Marshall used this term in his dissent. The majority adopted the term
while examining the dissent's arguments and reasoning in footnote 10 at 1532.
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time. 66
The Court cited the effects of the Justice Department's "beg"
policy as evidence of the lack of discriminatory effect upon the indictees as members of the pool of potential prosecutees:
The Government did not prosecute those who reported themselves
but later registered. Nor did it prosecute those who protested registration but did not report themselves or were not reported by others
....The Government, on the other hand, did prosecute people who
reported themselves or were reported by others but who did not publicly protest. These facts demonstrate
that the Government treated all
67
reported nonregistrants similarly.
Thus, although both the district court and the court of appeals had
concluded that Wayte had met the first requirement of the two-pronged test, the Supreme Court ruled that Wayte had failed to show a
discriminatory effect.
The Court then examined Wayte's evidence of discriminatory
purpose. 68 The Court concluded that Wayte had also failed to
demonstrate that the government had intended a discriminatory result. 6 9 The Court admitted, as the court of appeals had, that
Wayte's evidence revealed that the government was aware that the
passive enforcement system would result in prosecutions of vocal
nonregistrants who would likely make selective prosecution
claims. 70 The Court wrote that "'discriminatory purpose' implies
more than intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the
decisionmaker selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects
T
upon an identifiable group."'
The Court next addressed Wayte's argument that the passive
enforcement policy violated his first amendment right to free
speech. 72 The Court noted that Wayte's conduct included speech
66

n.10.

Compare 105 S. Ct. at 1542-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting) with 105 S.Ct. at 1532

105 S. Ct. at 1532 (emphasis added).
105 S. Ct. at 1532. Because Wayte's selective prosecution claim had not met the
first requirement of the test, the Court's discussion of the second requirement was
unnecessary.
69 Id.
70 Id. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
71 Id. (quoting Personnel Admin. of Massachusetts v. Fenney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)). The Court's quotation omitted footnotes, citations and several words in the
original text. The Court indicated these omissions with ellipses.
72 105 S.Ct. at 1532-34. Although Wayte had not challenged the selective enforcement policy directly on first amendment grounds before the lower courts, his brief to the
Supreme Court contained arguments almost wholly based on first amendment analysis.
See generally Brief for the Petitioner, Wayte v. United States, 105 S.Ct. 1524 (1985). Cf.
105 S.Ct. at 1539 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67
68
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and non-speech elements 73 and applied a four-part test.
First, the regulation must be "within the constitutional power
of the Government." 74 Second, it must further "an important or
substantial governmental interest. ' 75 Third, "the governmental interest .

.

. [must be] unrelated to the suppression of free expres-

sion."' 76 Finally, "the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms [must be] no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. ' 77 The Court dismissed the first and
third requirements without discussion because Wayte did not claim
78
that the passive enforcement system failed to satisfy them.
The Court examined the three reasons offered by the government to show that the passive enforcement policy furthered a "substantial governmental interest" and thus satisfied the second
requirement. The Court accepted the government's argument that
the passive policy allowed the government "to identify and prosecute violators without further delay." 7 9 The Court agreed that the
"passive enforcement program thus promoted prosecutorial efficiency." 80 The Court also agreed with the government's argument
73 Id. at 1533 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)). In
O'Brien, the Court upheld a congressional amendment to the Military Selective Service
Act making it a crime to knowingly destroy or mutilate a draft card. O'Brien had burned
his draft card in protest of the government's policies in Vietnam. 391 U.S. at 370. The
Court upheld the law, now 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(b)(3), under first amendment challenge. The Court stated that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 376.
Because the passive enforcement policy was a regulation with incidental limitations
on first amendment freedoms, the policy would be justified only if it met each of four
requirements originally set out in O'Brien. The Court has used this test on several occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985)(defendant's conviction
for re-entering a military base to make a protest, after being barred from the base, upheld because his exclusion did not violate the first amendment); Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)(protective order preventing newspaper from publishing
information about the plaintiffs obtained through pretrial discovery in a defamation action against the newspaper did not offend the first amendment); Members of the City
Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S 789 (1984)(city
ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property did not violate the first
amendment rights of group supporting a candidate for city council); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)(the California Department of Corrections' regulations regarding censorship of prisoner mail unconstitutionally restricted the free speech of the
prisoners and their correspondents and could not be justified).
74 105 S. Ct. at 1533 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
75 Id. (quoting O'Brien).
76 Id. (quoting O'Brien).
77 Id. (quoting O'Brien).
78 105 S.Ct. at 1533.
79 Id. at 1534.
80 Id.

1985]

SELECTIVE PROSECUTION

867

that Wayte's letters were helpful in establishing his intentional violation.8 1 Finally, the Court accepted the argument that prosecuting
visible nonregistrants promotes general deterrence.8 2 Thus, the
Court concluded that the passive enforcement policy did further a
83
substantial governmental interest.
The passive enforcement policy also met the fourth requirement that a regulation be no broader than necessary. Noting the
difficulties that the Selective Service had in acquiring names and
current addresses for an active enforcement system, the Court wrote
that "[p]assive enforcement was the only effective interim solution
available .... ,,84 Because the passive enforcement policy had met all
four requirements, the Court held that the policy withstood Wayte's
first amendment challenge.8 5
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented. Justice
Marshall argued that the issue before the Court was "whether Wayte
ha[d] earned the right to discover Government documents relevant
to his claim of selective prosecution. " 8s 6 The Court could not properly decide the substantive issues, Marshall argued, until Wayte had
the opportunity to support his arguments with the testimony and
documents that Marshall concluded Wayte was entitled to discover.8 7 Justice Marshall believed Wayte was entitled to discovery
because he had established a prima facie case of selective prosecution.8 8 The court of appeals had erred in reversing the district
court, Marshall wrote, because the district court had not abused its
81 Id
82 Id.
83 I&. at
84 Id. at
85 Id. at

1533-34.
1534.
1534-33. Before concluding the opinion, the Court made an observation

about the implications of Wayte's first amendment argument. The Court wrote that
Wayte's argument concerned self-reporting rather than passive enforcement. The
Court pointed out that if a court should accept such an argument, a criminal could use
the first amendment as a shield against prosecution. A criminal could commit a crime,
report himself as a protesting violator of the law in question, and thus obtain immunity.
The Court wrote that "[t]he First Amendment confers no such immunity from prosecution." Id. at 1534.
86 Id. at 1535 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88 Justice Marshall adopted his three-part test for a prima facie case of selective prosecution from Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), a case involving an equal protection challenge to grand jury selection procedures. Wayte would establish a prima
fade case, Marshall wrote, by showing: 1) "that he is a member of a recognizable, distinct class;" 2) "that a disproportionate number of this class was selected for investigation and possible prosecution;" and 3) "that this selection procedute was subject to
abuse or otherwise not neutral." 105 S. Ct. at 1541 (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494).
Marshall concluded that Wayte had shown sufficient evidence of each requirement. I&.
at 1542.
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discretion by finding that Wayte had made out a prima facie case.8 9
Marshall thus focused on the elements of the prima facie case and
the appropriate standard of appellate review. 90
Finally, Justice Marshall argued that the Court had erred in analyzing the merits of the selective prosecution claim. The majority
had focused on the government's treatment of known nonregistrants in holding that the government had not discriminated against
the indicted nonregistrants as members of the known group of
nonregistrants. 9 1 Justice Marshall reasoned that the Court should
have focused upon the fact that the passive system identified for
prosecution only those nonregistrants who had exercised their first
amendment rights. 9 2 Marshall agreed, however, that Wayte would
need to show discriminatory intent in order to invalidate the passive
93
enforcement system on equal protection grounds.
V.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court's decision establishes no new test, having
adopted the traditional two-pronged equal protection test for analyzing the selective prosecution claim and the United States v. O'Brien
test 9 4 for analyzing the first amendment challenge. Nevertheless, the

decision does break some new ground.
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE

First, applying the traditional two-pronged test, the Court held
that Wayte had failed to show that the passive enforcement system
had a discriminatory effect on vocal nonregistrants. 9 5 Both lower
courts held that Wayte had shown discriminatory effect, 96 but the
97
Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court reached this result because it refused to accept
Wayte's contention that he and 674,00098 other nonregistrants were
similarly situated. 9 9 The lower courts had concluded that the pas89 105 S. Ct. at 1540 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 Justice Marshall believed the court of appeals had conducted de novo review of
Wayte's claim, rather than looking solely at whether or not the district court had abused
its discretion. 105 S. Ct. at 1540 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91 See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
92 105 S. Ct. at 1542-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 1543.
94 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
95 105 S. Ct. at 1532.
96 549 F. Supp. at 1381; 710 F.2d at 1387.
97 105 S. Ct. at 1532.
98 See supra note 33.
99 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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sive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect based on the
fact that all of the indicted nonregistrants were vocally opposed to
the draft, while thousands of silent nonregistrants went unprosecuted. 10 0 The Court, however, preferred to characterize them not
as "silent,"''1 1 but rather as "unreported," "unknown" or "temporarily unidentifiable" nonregistrants. 10 2 Wayte was not similarly situated to the thousands of nonregistrants, the Court reasoned,
because he was a reported and known violator. 0 3
The Court's statement of facts details the government's unsuccessful efforts to establish an active enforcement system prior to
Wayte's indictment.104 The Court, unlike the district court
judge, 0 5 apparently viewed the government's efforts as reasonable
and in good faith. 10 6 Had the Court believed, for example, the district court judge's statement that "[t]he inference is strong that the
Government could have located non-vocal non-registrants, but
chose not to,"'10 7 the Court might have decided in Wayte's favor.
Thus, the Court apparently assumed that when a law enforcement agency makes reasonable and good faith efforts to identify all
violators of a particular law, the proper focus for the discriminatoryeffect prong of the two-pronged test is upon the prosecutor's treatment of the known violators. A court need not take unknown violators into account in resolving a defendant's selective prosecution
claim when the prosecuting authority's good faith efforts to identify
all violators have failed. Because Wayte could not show that he had
100 549 F. Supp. at 1391. See also 710 F.2d at 1387.
101 The Court stated that the term "vocal non-registrant" was "misleading insofar as
it suggests that all those indicted had made public statements opposing registration. In
some cases, the only statement made by the nonregistrant prior to indictment was his
letter to the Government declaring his refusal to register." 105 S. Ct. at 1530, n.6. Cf.
Brief for the United States at 25 n.18, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
102 Although the Court never explicitly used any of these terms to refer to the socalled "silent" nonregistrants, the Court repeatedly used the word "reported" to refer
to the nonregistrants identified by the passive enforcement system. See 105 S. Ct. at
1532.
103 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
104 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
105 See supra note 45.
106 The Court implied this when it wrote:
Although Selective Service was engaged in developing an active enforcement program when it investigated petitioner, it had by then found no practicable way of
obtaining the names and current addresses of likely nonregistrants. Eventually, it
obtained them by matching state driver's license records with Social Security files.
It took some time, however, to obtain the necessary authorizations and to set up this
system. Passive enforcement was the only effective interim solution available to
carry out the Government's compelling interest.
105 S. Ct. at 1534 (footnote omitted).
107 549 F. Supp. at 1381.
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been treated differently from other known nonregistrants, the existence of unknown nonregistrants could not establish discriminatory
effect.
The Court, after finding that Wayte had failed to show discriminatory effect, nevertheless applied the second part of the traditional
test for selective prosecution. The Court inquired whether the government's use of the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory purpose and concluded that it did not because Wayte had "not
shown that the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities." 1 08 The Court admitted that the government was aware of
the probability that vocal nonregistrants would be prosecuted under
the passive system. 0 9 The Court, however, distinguished the government's decision to knowingly proceed on a course of action "in
spite of" adverse effects on a particular group from knowingly proceeding "because of' those adverse effects. 110
Had the Court not made this distinction, it would have confused "discriminatory purpose" with mere knowledge of discriminatory effects. When a person acts with a purpose,"' he deliberately
acts to achieve a goal or objective. On the other hand, when one
acts with knowledge of his action's effects, he may or may not be
acting with those effects as his objectives. In the former instance he
acts because of the action's effects; in the latter instance he acts,
perhaps, in spite of those effects.
Confusion over the Court's definition of "discriminatory purpose" in the equal protection context results from the criminal and
12
tort laws' presumption that a defendant intended his voluntary act."
The defendant's tortious or criminal intent is presumed when he
knew the consequences of his act.' 1 3 While defining "discriminatory
purpose," the Court has explicitly rejected the common law's conceptions regarding intent. "'Discriminatory

more

that

intent

as

volition

or

intent

purpose'.

as

. .

implies

awareness

of

108 105 S. Ct. at 1532.
109 Id. at 1530.
110 Id. The Court originally drew this distinction in Personnel Admin. of Massachu-

setts v. Feeney, 442 U.S 256, 279 (1979), cited by the Court. The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit had already used the "because of" rationale when it rejected Wayte's
claim that the government had employed the passive enforcement system for a discriminatory purpose. 710 F.2d at 1387 (citing United States v. Ness, 652 F.2d 890, 892 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981)). See supra text accompanying note 34.
111 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1112 (5th ed. 1979); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTiNARY 1847 (1966); 35A WORDS AND PHRASES "Purpose" (1963 & Supp.
1985).
112 See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278.
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A comment b (1965); W. LAFAvE & A.
ScoT'r, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28 (1972).
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consequences.""14

The Court's "because of" definition for discriminatory purpose
is especially appropriate when the Court subjects a prosecutor's decision-making to an equal protection analysis. If the Court were to
hold that a prosecutor's knowledge of a prosecutorial policy's discriminatory effects constituted an impermissible discriminatory purpose, a perverse incentive would be created. Prosecutors would in
effect be encouraged to avoid knowing or researching the effects of
their own prosecutorial policies.11 5 Ignorance of a policy's effects
would be the simplest means of defending the policy against an
equal protection challenge.
THE FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE

Wayte first challenged the passive enforcement system on first
amendment grounds in his brief to the Supreme Court. 1 6 Wayte
argued that a showing of the gdvernment's discriminatory purpose
was irrelevant to a proper "First Amendment analysis of the passive
enforcement system's impact on protected expression."' 1 7 Thus,
Wayte was asking the Court to develop a new one-pronged test for
selective prosecution claims based on the exercise of First Amendment rights.1 8 . Under the test Wayte proposed, once a court deter114 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented in
Feeney because of the Court's definition of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 281-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart, the writer of the majority opinion in Feeney, had
earlier written that "awareness [of racial effects] is not, however, the equivalent of discriminatory intent." UnitedJewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 180 (1977)(Stewart, J.,
concurring). Justice Powelljoined Stewart's concurrence in Carey and the majority opinion in Feeney.
115 But cf.NATIONAL DISTRICT ATrORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standards 6.1 and 6.3 (1977)(imposing duties to develop a statement of "general
policies to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion" and to "maintain sufficient
[statistical] data to evaluate and monitor the performance of the [prosecutor's] office.")
Before the Court's decision in Wayte, one author wrote that "when the prosecutor
has such knowledge [that other violators are not being prosecuted], or when such knowledge can be inferred, purposeful discrimination is more likely to be found." B.
GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, § 4.3(c)(2) (1985)(footnotes omitted). After
Wayte, this statement is apparently true only when the prosecutor knows, or should know
through good faith efforts, who those other violators actually are.
116 See generally Brief for Petitioner, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
117 Brief for Petitioner at 26, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
118 Others have also suggested removing the discriminatory puropose (or motive) requirement from the test for selective prosecution. Note, Rethinking Selective Enforcement in
the FirstAmendment Context, 84 COLUM. L. REv. (1984) Comment, United States v. Wayte:
The Big Chill on Vocal Draft Nonregistrants, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 102 (1984).
Defendants in the federal courts have brought hundreds of claims of selective prosecution based on their First Amendment rights. See Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 732 (1979)
(cases far too numerous to cite here). The federal courts, however, have only upheld
these claims in three cases, and in each case the court required the defendant to show
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mined that a prosecutorial policy or system adversely affected those
violators exercising their first amendment rights compared to those
who remained silent, the court would strike down the policy without
inquiring into the prosecutor's motive or intent. 1 19
The Court never directly rejected Wayte's argument, but did so
indirectly by refusing to adopt or formulate such a new test. The
Court addressed the selective prosecution claim by applying the
traditional two-pronged test.1 20 The Court then applied the traditional O'Brien12 ' balancing test to the first amendment challenge.
Because the Court did not directly address the issue, all that the
decision states on its face is that, under the circumstances before it,
the Court was unwilling to remove the discriminatory purpose requirement from its equal protection analysis simply because the first
amendment was involved. It is not clear how the Court would have
held if the Court had found, as the lower lower courts had, that the
passive system had a discriminatory effect on first amendment
rights, but had then found no discriminatory purpose on the government's part.
Although the dissent discussed the standard used to decide
when a defendant has established a prima facie case of selective
prosecution and thus shifted the burden to the government, the majority refused to address the matter. The majority thus declined to
lay down a rule as to when a defendant is entitled to discovery on his
claim of selective prosecution. The majority's silence may be
12 2
deemed tacit approval of the standards used by lower courts.
The Court's opinion resolved the immediate dispute between
the parties. The Court also resolved the conflict between the circuits regarding the use of the selective prosecution defense against
indictments and convictions under the passive enforcement system
discriminatory purpose in order to succeed with the claim. United States v. Falk, 479

F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973)(en banc); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.
1972); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
119 Brief for Petitioner at 26-31, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 (1985).
120 105 S.Ct. at 1531-32.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 74-77. This test balances the defendant's right
to free speech with the government's interest in the regulation of the non-speech elements of that speech. The government's interest must be "important or substantial."
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
122 The district court judge, applying the standard of United States v. Erne, 576 F.2d
212, 216 (9th Cir. 1978), required Wayte to "allege enough facts to take the question [of
selective prosecution] beyond the frivolous stage." 549 F. Supp. at 1379. In order to
shift the burden to the government, the district court judge required Wayte to further
establish by evidence a prima facie case-discriminatory effect and purpose-of selective
prosecution. Id. at 1382.
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employed by the Selective Service and the Department ofJustice.123
Because the Selective Service now uses an active system to identify
nonregistrants, 124 the Court did not need to make a broad decision
concerning selective prosecution. With the handful of indictees
identified through the passive system already in court, the Court
could tailor its decision to the facts before it. Those indicted under
the active system will not have available the selective prosecution
defense thus, the Court had no reason to decide more than was necessary to resolve the case before it and the conflict between the
circuits.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court held that Wayte had not satisfied the first requirement of the selective prosecution test because Wayte was only similarly situated to nonregistrants whom the government had in fact
identified. The Court thus correctly concluded that a court deciding
a selective prosecution claim need not consider unknown violators
when the prosecutor has made reasonable, good faith efforts to
identify those violators. The Court also held that Wayte had not met
the "discriminatory purpose" requirement of the selective prosecution test. Wayte had been unable to show that the government had
developed or employed the passive enforcement system because of its
adverse effects upon "vocal" nonregistrants. This decision is also
correct, because to hold otherwise would confuse knowledge with
purpose and encourage prosecutors to be ignorant of the effects of
their prosecutorial policies.
The Court separately decided the first amendment issue. The
Court refused to remove the "discriminatory purpose" requirement
from its equal protection analysis merely because first amendment
activity was involved. The Court thus avoided the absurd situation
123 See supra note 57. The Court denied certiorari in Eklund v. United States, Martin v.
United States, and Sasway v. United States, all reported at 105 S. Ct. 1864 (1985), immedi-

ately after its decision in Wayte. Eklund, Martin, and Sasway all raised selective prosecution claims.
124 Since early 1983 Selective Service has employed an "active enforcement" system to identify and locate non-registrants. This system utilizes Social Security
records and state driver's license lists, as well as information from other federal and
state sources. A suspected non-registrant is notified at least twice by letter of his
duty to register; if he refuses to comply, Selective Service refers his name to the
Department
ofJustice
investigation
and possible prosecution. We are advised
that, as ofJune
1984, afor
total
of more than
160,000 names have been transmitted to
the Department under the "active" system, and that 599 of these people have been
selected at random for further investigation; to date, all1 such people who were
subjectpolicy,
to theand
registration
requirement have
havebeen
elected
to comply pursuant to the
"beg"
thus no prosecutions
instituted.
Brief for the United States at 10, Wayte v. United States, 105 5. Ct. 1524 (1985).
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where a criminal, by reporting his own crime, could use the first
amendment as a shield against prosecution.
By the time of the Court's decision, the Selective Service System had abandoned the passive enforcement system and had
adopted an active system for identifying nonregistrants. Because
those indicted under the active system will be unable to make selective prosecution claims, Justice Powell wisely wrote a narrow opinion that decided the case before the Court, resolved the conflict
between the circuits, and avoided unnecessarily broad pronouncements on selective prosecution.
GARY

D. SARLES

